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Abstract. In cases such as World War I grief or trauma were nearly universal in the European
context and a direct consequence of a political experience of war. This article asks whether
widespread social suffering may have a social and political expression that is larger than the
sum of traumatised or bereaved individuals. Section 1 explores Martha Nussbaum’s theory of
emotion, particularly as it relates to grief and compassion and uses this to build two
contrasting typologies of grief and trauma. Central to this contrast is the idea that grief, as an
emotion, is embedded in a community, while trauma and emotional numbing correspond with
a breakdown of community and an isolation, which may give rise to solipsism. The latter
would appear to make any notion of social trauma a contradiction in terms. Section 2 draws
on the philosopher Wittgenstein’s critique in the Philosophical Investigations of his early work
in the Tractatus, to argue that even the solipsist exists in a particular kind of social world.
This provides a foundation for arguing, in Section 3, that social trauma can find expression in
a political solipsism, which has dangerous consequences. Section 4 theorises the relationship
between trauma, identity and agency at the international level.
During the First World War more than nine million died as a result of the fighting,
and were killed at an average rate of more than 6,000 a day for more than four and a
quarter years.1 Bereavement was universal across Europe, affecting almost every
family. According to Jay Winter, this bereavement found expression in two forms.2
First, there was an appeal to classical, romantic or religious images and ideas, given
their power to mediate bereavement. Alongside this traditional language of mourn-
ing a second and opposite trend emerged at ‘the cutting edge of “modern memory”.
Its multi-faceted sense of dislocation, paradox, and the ironic, could express anger
and despair, and did so in enduring ways; … but it could not heal’.3 By the time of
the Second World War the traditional language of mourning was in demise. Both
the changing nature of warfare and the horrific consequences of the war were a
source of the rupture. More than half of the fifty million people who died in the
Second World War were civilians, and many perished in a new way.4 The nuclear
bombardment of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was new, as was the extermination of
Jews in Europe. In both catastrophes, the limits of language had been reached.
There seemed no way to adequately express the hideousness and scale of the
cruelties. As Julia Kristeva observed, the Second World War undermined the very
symbols through which meaning – any meaning – could be attached to the cataclysm
of war.5
Winter points to two qualitatively different responses to massive loss. In referring
to catastrophes of this magnitude, the words grief and trauma are often used
interchangeably. Both words suggest a loss of control and vulnerability imposed by
the surrounding world. Yet the two connote different experiences insofar as grief is
an emotion related to a process of mourning, and, as suggested above, a rich and
symbolic cultural language. Trauma, by contrast, is more of a ‘dislocation’ accom-
panied by an inability to mourn or speak of the trauma. They are also distinguished
by the reference to a larger community and a shared language as opposed to
isolation, meaninglessness and silence.
Grief and trauma belong to a vocabulary of individual psychology or psycho-
analysis. Yet, in these cases, grief or trauma were nearly universal, at least in the
European context, and a direct consequence of a political experience of war. This
raises a question that has been largely ignored in the literature of international
relations.6 Do widespread grief and trauma have a social and political expression
that is larger than the sum of traumatised or bereaved individuals? If so, do the
political consequences of the two differ? 
In the first section I examine Martha Nussbaum’s theory of emotion, particularly
as it relates to grief and compassion. I use this to build two contrasting typologies of
grief and trauma. Central to this contrast is the idea that grief, as an emotion, is
embedded in a community, while trauma and emotional numbing correspond with a
breakdown of community and an isolation, which may give rise to solipsism. In
regard to the larger question, this distinction presents a puzzle. If trauma is
distinguished from grief by the collapse of community7 or a loss of trust in one’s
social world,8 in the form of betrayal or humiliation,9 it would seem impossible for
the latter to have any political expression. Social trauma would appear to be a
contradiction in terms. However, there is reason to believe such a contradiction is
possible, particularly in light of the portrayal of 11 September 2001 as a trauma not
only to individuals but to American identity as a whole. In Section 2 I draw on the
philosopher Wittgenstein’s critique in Philosophical Investigations of his early work
in Tractatus Logicus Philosophicus, to argue that even the solipsist exists in a
particular kind of social world. This provides a foundation for arguing, in Section 3,
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that social trauma can find expression in a political solipsism, which has dangerous
consequences. In Section 4 I theorise the relationship between trauma, identity and
agency at the international level.
Community vs. isolation
Helplessness and loss of control are manifestations of trauma. But loss of control is
also an element of normal emotion. Trauma and emotion both represent vulner-
ability in relation to others. This raises a question about how grief and trauma stand
in relation to one another. In this section, I argue that the relationship between
individual and community is vital to a distinction between the two. While emotions
of grief and compassion are expressions of mutual vulnerability between self and
other, emotional numbing is characteristic of trauma.10 This corresponds with a
hardening of the boundaries between self and others, in an attempt to reduce
vulnerability.
Martha Nussbaum argues that emotions are ‘appraisals or value judgements
which ascribe to things and persons outside the person’s own control great impor-
tance for that person’s own flourishing’.11 In this respect, emotions are an expression
of our vulnerability to events that we don’t control. Rather than contrary to
rationality, as often conceived, emotions involve a form of evaluative judgement,
which she refers to as eudaimonistic judgement (EJ). EJ involves thought of an object
combined with thought of the object’s salience or importance to one’s own survival
and flourishing. For instance, the object of Nussbaum’s grief, that is, her mother, is
invested with great value and importance. The sight of the dead body is intolerable
because this serves as a reminder that value is also the basis for irretrievable loss.
The emotion also has a history. The grief includes traces of a whole range of other
emotions lurking in the background that give it specific content and cognitive
specificity.
Grief is an emotion experienced by a person who suffers loss. Nussbaum further
explores the related emotion of compassion or the pain one experiences in observing
another suffer. Compassion rests on three cognitive elements. First, it rests on a
judgement of size, for example, that the bad event that has befallen someone is
serious in nature. Second, that the person is not to blame for the suffering that has
befallen them. Third, it rests on an EJ that the person is significant in the observer’s
scheme of goals and projects. Aristotle, who had a similar schema, added a fourth
condition of compassion: the observer must be able to imagine that they would find
themselves in similar circumstances to the aggrieved, as an aid in forming the EJ.
While Nussbaum sees this element as important, she does not see it as necessary.12
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Her conclusion about the two emotions, grief and compassion, is similar. She
says:
In order for grief to be present, the dead person must be seen and valued as a part of the
mourner’s own life, her scheme of goals and projects. Similarly, in order for compassion to be
present, the person must consider the suffering of another as a significant part of his or her
own scheme of goal and ends. In effect, she must make herself vulnerable in the person of the
other. It is the EJ, not the judgement of similar possibilities, that seems to be a necessary
constituent of compassion.13
Both grief and compassion require the ability to value others as a part of one’s own
goals and projects. Thus, a connection and relationship to others is key to her theory
of emotion.14
An example helps to demonstrate the dynamics of this relationship and sets the
stage for a later contrast involving trauma. Both are based on episodes of the British
television series, Eastenders, which has been frequently praised for its sensitive
handling of social and moral issues. In the one case, Sharon’s partner, Tom, has died
in a fire after rescuing a child and while returning to the burning house for the
child’s abusive father. After Tom’s heroic death, Sharon’s friends and neighbours
insist that she not be alone and make repeated efforts, against her resistance, to care
for her. Tom is valorised as a hero, the local pub cancels a party and loses profit out
of respect for Sharon’s grief. In this example Sharon’s loss of Tom is made easier by
her embeddedness in a community of people who care about her and recognise the
relationship between her EJ and their own.
Compassion requires the experience of pain at the thought of a separate person’s
suffering. In Nussbaum’s argument, empathy, while requiring an identification and
understanding of what the other is experiencing, involves an awareness that one is
separate and not in that place. In so far as the empathetic person reconstructs the
experience of another, it may pave the way to compassion, but is not sufficient for
compassion. One can have empathy with a joyful as well as a bad experience, while
compassion assumes the object to be in the latter category. One can, however, have
empathy with someone in a bad state without compassion. The torturer can be
aware of his victim’s suffering, and even enjoy imagining it, without the least bit of
compassion for her pain.
Loss and the compassion of others are the ingredients of a normal grieving
process. The emotions attached to loss find expression within a community. By
contrast, grief may become trauma if accompanied by a breakdown in relations
with others, for example due to an experience of betrayal or humiliation. Consider
another storyline from Eastenders. Melanie has just lost her husband, Steve, in a car
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explosion. She values him as part of her own EJ. The people in her environment
respond by bringing flowers or attending the funeral to support Melanie. There is
thus a sense of empathy, based on a number of social rules. These rules define the
death of a husband as serious (size) and as an act that has befallen Melanie through
no fault of her own. Their acts correspond with how one normally responds to
events of this kind, that is, with public displays of sympathy.
However, despite these public displays, there is an absence of the third category,
that is, the person as significant in the observer’s goals and projects, and thus the
emotion of compassion. The funeral is followed by a series of interactions in which
friends and acquaintances act on the basis of their own EJ, one of which leads to
Melanie’s conviction for a crime she knew nothing about. In addition, her best
friend, Lisa, fails to tell Melanie that it was she, rather than Steve, who, in an earlier
episode, had tried to murder Phil. Because she does not know this, her grief is
distorted by an inaccurate belief that her husband was a cold-blooded murderer.
When she discovers the lie, she loses all faith in her surroundings and leaves the
Square to start a new life, left to mourn in strange surroundings on her own. The
normal grief that accompanies the death of a husband will have become trauma. If
grief rests on a positive valuation of the other, trauma, its opposite, is a response to
the absence of value.
Loss vs. betrayal
The psychological literature focuses on the individual element of trauma, that is,
what is happening inside the individual body or mind. This argument draws out the
social and political dimension of the relationship to others. According to Zinner and
Williams, traumas arising from human interactions, as distinct from natural
disasters, are more difficult to come to terms with because the pain is a byproduct of
intentional action.15 It may further result from the neglect of others. In this respect,
while positive emotions reach out to others, negative emotions of humiliation, fear,
betrayal and loss of trust may contribute to isolation. Hobbes emphasised that
positive emotion cannot find expression in war, precisely because of the constant
fear of death.16 Social disasters may be characterised by different degrees of
intentionality,17 but its presence is key to the psychological dimension of trauma.
Jenny Edkins argues that trauma involves a betrayal of trust. ‘What we call
trauma takes place when the very powers that we are convinced will protect us and
give us security become our tormentors: when the community of which we con-
sidered ourselves members turns against us or when our family is no longer a source
of refuge but a site of danger’.18 The ‘external’ shock most often identified with
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trauma comes in the form of an absence, a loss of trust, a lack of acknowledgement
or value. Child abuse is a form of intentional act, which results in a breakdown of
trust and security.
Genocide, and particularly the experience of Jews in the German concentration
camps, is another example of intentional action that resulted in a collapse of
meaning and safety.19 The state, whose role is to protect its citizens, betrayed this
trust vis-à-vis a portion of its own population. As Clendinnen notes, those who were
flung into the work camps found themselves abruptly reduced from a unique
‘someone’, comfortably located within a web of work, place, family, friends and
associates, to a shorn and naked biped marked by a tattooed number.20 The individual
was forcefully removed from their social context and dropped in a place where every
symbol of individual identity, from clothes to hair to family members, and even their
name, was taken from them. The victims were robbed of those symbols and relation-
ships by which life is given meaning and stripped of their identity and agency. Worse
than the negative empathy of the torturer, genocide denies the humanity of the
other.21
Grief and trauma are two distinct experiences, although in practice the two
comprise a spectrum rather than representing absolute types. Grief that coexists
with compassion is situated within a social world where the painful experience has
meaning within a community such that the bereaved receives the necessary support
over time to redefine her place in everyday life in the absence of the loved person.
The positive emotions attached to Tom and his heroism, as well as the loving
support of those around her, allowed Sharon to find positive meaning in Tom’s
death. Over time he moves out of the centre of Sharon’s emotional world, which is
increasingly filled by others as she resumes some kind of normal life. In this respect,
normal grief can be said to have ‘sense’. Although painful, the process of integrating
the experience into a meaningful social world is facilitated by the compassion of
others.
By contrast, grief accompanied by betrayal and isolation is constitutive of
Melanie’s trauma. In this case, her grief or her world cease to have ‘sense’, and are
transported outside of normal experience. She exists alone in relation to the world
and in this aloneness the world becomes synonymous with her trauma. As an
isolated individual outside community, the world is not mediated in a dialogue with
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others. Instead, the individual, fixed on the experience of the past, brings this past to
each present interaction. Traumatic memory or time is not the same as everyday
memory or time. The linearity of the latter is disrupted. The traumatised person
continues to live and re-live, remember and re-remember the trauma alongside
ordinary life.22 The trauma is at one and same time outside normal life, that is, it has
no ‘sense’ within a meaningful community, yet becomes constitutive of a reality in
which the traumatised is continually fearful of others and vigilant for the threat to
recur.
Trauma and solipsism
Grief/compassion and trauma/isolation rest on the difference between the individual
embedded in a community vs. the individual suffering alone. This distinction makes
any notion of social or political trauma a contradiction in terms. The purpose of
this section is to construct a stepping stone between an understanding of trauma as
constituted in isolation, with the collapse of community, and a concept of ‘political
solipsism’. As a framework for this analysis, I examine Wittgenstein’s use of solipsism
in his earlier work, Tractatus Logicus-Philosophicus (TLP),23 through the lens of his
later work, Philosophical Investigations (PI),24 where he examines the bewitching
element of the former.
Neither emotion nor trauma has an explicit place in Wittgenstein’s thought. It
would be wrong to suggest that Wittgenstein intended to give an account of the
relationship of the traumatised individual to the world. Despite this, the connection
made in what follows is justified for two reasons. First, in the later work, PI,
Wittgenstein shows the flaw in the solipsism of the earlier work by demonstrating
the embeddedness of all forms of human life in cultural and social customs, institu-
tions and uses, grounded in language. The detached individual of the TLP is
replaced by human dependence on social and historical context. This move is central
to the line of argument pursued here.
Second, if one looks at Wittgenstein’s own context while he was completing the
TLP, the potential role of trauma, either observed or experienced, is not far to see.25
The first draft of the Tractatus, which focused exclusively on logic, was conceived
behind the lines of World War I. The content was transformed in the second draft,
which was written after Wittgenstein’s transfer to the front lines. His concern with
the ‘unspeakable’ emerged at a time when he was grappling with questions of life
and death on the battlefield, of isolation and despair, coupled with glimmers of
transcendence.
As Ray Monk, his biographer notes, once Wittgenstein went to the front lines he
asked to be assigned to the most dangerous of places, the observation post, where he
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would be a target of enemy fire. After enduring night duty, during which the shelling
was heaviest, he reported that he had been in constant danger of his life.26 It is thus
very likely that Wittgenstein would have observed, or experienced himself, some
form of shell-shock.27 Further, the final version of the book was written in Vienna,
immediately following word that ‘his first and only friend’ had been killed in an
airplane accident.28 Wittgenstein was suicidal after hearing the news, and dedicated
the completed book to his lost friend.29 The context of the TLP combined the
experience of war on the Front Line with a sudden and tragic personal loss.
While the TLP was an original piece of work, which broke new ground in phil-
osophy, his theme of the coincidence of solipsism with realism also resonated with
Wittgenstein’s historical context. Solipsism is derived from an idealist transcendental
tradition, which in Wittgenstein’s case drew on Schopenhauer. Solipsism at one and
the same time takes the individual out of the world, and collapses the external world
into the individual’s experience of it. Given a background of war it can be seen as
resulting from a morbid sensitivity to suffering which takes flight from reality into ‘a
merely “inner” world, a “real” world, an “eternal’ world’.30 According to Monk,
when this state of mind is made the basis of a philosophy it becomes solipsism or
the view that the world and my world are one and the same thing.
This solipsism, Wittgenstein argued, coincided with an ontological realism, which
assumes that logic exists in the world, outside the individual. On this convergence he
said:
This is the way I have travelled: Idealism singles men out from the world as unique, solipsism
singles me alone out, and at least I see that I too belong with the rest of the world, and so on
the one side nothing is left over, and on the other side, as unique, the world. In this way
idealism leads to realism if it is strictly thought out.31
Language is conceived by a spectator who stands outside the world, not by an agent
embedded within it.32 Words are applied as labels, strung together in propositions,
which picture the logic of the world. The world is frozen in a series of abstract
propositions. There exists a realm of individual experience, beyond sense, and thus
beyond words. The ‘unspeakable’, like the divine, transcends the language of normal
everyday experience. One can imagine the philosopher standing at an observation
post with shells raining down around him, frozen speechless with fear, the world
outside utterly beyond control. The connection between trauma and the inability to
speak is now conventional wisdom.33 In the TLP, Wittgenstein presents a picture of
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a world existing outside the self, and a self outside the world, its observer. In the
combination of realism and idealism, the individual is constituted as profoundly
alone, the inner life radically incommunicable and incapable of being shared with
others.34
As Pears argues, solipsism stands at the intersection of many lines of thought in
Wittgenstein’s mind. Some of these, in and of themselves, would be difficult to
follow if singled out and developed separately.35 The difficulty is only increased
when they are woven together in a single text. However, several themes do emerge
from his argument about solipsism.36 One theme is the detachment of the subject
from the world. Idealism, like solipsism, is introduced as a theory that allows the
subject to float free of physical attachments or constraints. This solipsism coincides
with a realism. The realist element is concerned with how much the individual mind
contributes to the thinker’s picture of the world and how much exists independent of
his thought.
The coincidence of realism and a transcendent idealism during the Great War and
after were not exclusive to Wittgenstein. Arguably, as suggested earlier, in the midst
of overwhelming suffering and loss, ‘inner’ escape would be a normal response to
abnormal events. This tension pervaded a context marked by bloody trench warfare,
involving widespread shell-shock and mass bereavement. It was expressed in the rise
of spiritualism, a consolidation of a ‘science of mind’, focused on trauma and
hypnosis, and the important role of a transcendent religious imagery in making
sense of loss. 37
The social construction of solipsism
Wittgenstein’s picture of solipsism in the TLP is compatible with a picture of the
traumatised individual, detached from a world of non-related objects, and outside
time. The experience of trauma is one ‘whereof we cannot speak’.38 The abstract
logic of this world, absent any emotion, is pictured in a set of labels, linked in
propositions. The picture in the TLP is, however, one of the isolated individual. It is
contrary to any notion of solipsism as a social phenomenon characterising a
community or state. Wittgenstein’s later work, PI, which represented a critique of his
earlier work in TLP, provides a bridge to a concept of ‘political solipsism’.
In this later work, Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein demonstrated that
the earlier conception of the solipsist individual was a ‘house of cards’. He dissolved
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the dialectical relationship between idealism and realism, and situated the self
squarely in a common world of language, where expressions of pain or joy, or other
expressions of our inner life are radically dependent on customs, uses and institu-
tions.39 Language is not merely a medium of communication but a social property
that is the prior condition for individual thought as well as meaningful interaction
with others. Emotion, like any other human experience, belongs to a social world.
Those experiences that we assume to exist independent of language, such as pain,
are fundamentally dependent on language for their meaning. The idea of giving a
name to pain presupposes the existence of a grammar including the word pain that
shows the place of this word in relation to others.40 In this respect, the expression of
pain is part of a language game, where the one who experiences it reaches out to
others, seeking acknowledgement.41 However, the individual nature of pain also
contrasts the certainty of the one who suffers with the doubt of the observer.42
Denial of another’s pain is thus a possible and contrary move to that of acknowledge-
ment. Further, emotions such as compassion, shame or humiliation presume a
relationship to others. One feels compassion toward others, or feels shame or
humiliation before them.
Social constructivists, building on this tradition, have argued that emotion only
finds expression in a language and a culture which is associated with a moral order
and moral appraisal.43 Emotion has a social function and a narrative form, based on
a system of rules by which actions and actors are ‘maintained, changed, critically
accounted and taught’.44 The experience of emotion may be individual, but if
expressed, it is expressed in relation to others, and in a language understandable to
them. In this respect, the appraisal or value judgements discussed by Nussbaum are
not purely cognitive.45 Individuals within a culture make appraisals and value
judgements, which draw on cultural knowledge within a moral order. It is only
within a culture and a society that the boundaries of appropriate and inappropriate
emotion are defined. It is in relation to others that pain is acknowledged or denied,
or the intention to cause pain, that is, blame, is attributed or denied. The ack-
nowledgement or denial of other’s pain may be linked to a range of questions. Was a
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particular case of suffering sufficient in size to warrant compassion (for example,
was Jenin a massacre or merely a battle)? Was an other to blame for their suffering
(are they or do they identify with terrorists)? Is the other connected to our own goals
and schemes (they are Muslims, not Christians)? In this respect, the acknowledge-
ment or denial of pain by the observer is a political act. It establishes the identity of
the other and the legitimacy of their pain.
From the perspective of Wittgenstein’s later work, the distinction between grief/
community and trauma/isolation is bewitching.46 It suggests that the victim of
trauma, as distinct from the normal bereaved, exists as an isolated entity outside of
history. It emphasises the inability to speak of the traumatic event. However,
solipsism itself, from this perspective, is constructed within a social world. An
example demonstrates how this would be possible. In a study titled Constructing
Panic, Capps and Ochs provide an in-depth analysis of the world of a woman
suffering from agrophobia, another condition defined by isolation, and reveal the
extent to which her solitude and anxiety were constructed in relation to others.47
While the woman did not have a name for her condition, she did have a consistent
pattern of narrating her ‘self ’ representation, which the analysts uncovered. These
narratives relied on a grammar of abnormality, helplessness and panic, which she
had developed as protective tools in the mediation of her relationships to others.
The woman would frequently portray herself as in the grip of forces larger than
herself, which impelled her to carry out some action, in which her action was
‘caused’ rather than willed. The ‘disorder’ was not physiological in origin, but rather
evolved as a way of dealing with her inability to state her needs directly, and the
inability of others to hear her when she tried.48
Language is not a medium that represents thought, as if the latter existed as an
entity independent of language. Rather, even the agrophobic’s internal rumination is
dependent on linguistic forms and rules, acquired not in isolation, but as part of
socialisation into a particular world in which thick boundaries isolate self from
other and communication is distorted by an inability to speak directly of one’s
emotions and be heard. The possibility of giving one set of meanings as opposed to
another to her experience is dependent on a language and a history of communic-
ation with others.
Trauma, like agrophobia, is not a condition outside ‘sense’ or ‘meaning’; rather
meaning becomes transfixed on the traumatic event. The traumatised individual may
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find it impossible to communicate directly the meaning of their experience; nonethe-
less, their linguistic world is organised around it. The boundaries of meaning are
circumscribed by a frozen picture of the past, which continues to structure inter-
actions with others. Held captive by this picture, the self engages with the world as if
past and present were inseparable, and as if the world were her world of trauma.
Political solipsism
It is a small step from an argument that individual solipsism and negative emotions
are constituted in language and in relation to others, to an argument that an exper-
ience of social trauma can set the stage for the constitution of political solipsism. It
is tempting to think about political trauma as a metaphor for the individual
experience. However, psychological trauma itself was originally a metaphor for
a physical wound to the human body, often arising from battle.49 It was only
psychologised in the nineteenth century.50 In this respect, political trauma would be
a metaphor for a metaphor. I argue that it is more useful to develop political trauma
as a separate level of analysis in which the traumatic ‘shock’ is directed at a political
and social category and where this shock has implications for the identity and
agency of the group. While war involves physical, psychological and political
trauma, these are all byproducts of a political context. The three experiences may
intermingle as part of a ‘politics of trauma’, while remaining separate levels of
experience or treatment. Political trauma is larger than the sum of traumatised
individuals in a context. While the psychological and political are related, they are
not equivalent.
Claiming political trauma as a separate level of analysis makes it possible to go
beyond the application of psychoanalytic categories to the group, that is, treating
groups as if they were individuals, to an exploration of the role of a language of
emotion in constituting political solipsism. In his pathbreaking work, Vamik Volkan
developed a psychoanalytic theory of unresolved group mourning based on the
concept of a ‘chosen trauma’.51 He distinguishes normal group mourning from
unresolved mourning. Normal group mourning is fairly uncomplicated. For instance,
after the initial shock of the crash of the US space shuttle Challenger, American
society became involved in a variety of religious and cultural rituals and, over time,
the collective mourning faded away. However, some collective tragedies are more
complicated and involve long-lasting damage. These include more monumental
calamities, often related to war, where the group is left dazed, helpless, and too
afraid, humiliated or angry to even initiate the mourning process.52 The sociologist
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Kai T. Erikson has referred to this type of loss as a breakdown of the ‘tissue of
community’.53
In Volkan’s theory, those aspects of the self that are unacceptable, such as humili-
ation, are enveloped and externalised to others who fit the perception of the
traumatised self.54 He refers to ‘mental representations’ of the humiliation that
become consolidated in shared feelings, perceptions, fantasies and interpretations.
Transgenerational transmission of trauma relies on a concept of ‘psychological
DNA’ which only re-emerges under certain conditions.55 The Israeli psychoanalyst,
Rena Moses-Hrushovski, uses the concept of deployment to describe a process, at
either the individual or the collective level, of dissociation from painful emotions of
shame.56 Deployment involves the creation of a rigid structure of roles and organis-
ation for the purpose of protection, which closes down the possibility of direct
communication with the other, and results in a life-long battle against ‘enemies’,
which have been a source of repression, harm or humiliation. Deployment, like
Volkan’s ‘enveloping’, is a response to trauma and the inability to mourn loss.
Both concepts suggest that the collective deals with trauma in much the same way
as the individual, enveloping or deploying unacknowledged emotions, but do not
specify the relationship between the individual and the political experience. The
sociologists Scheff and Rezinger locate these processes more directly in a social
world of discourse.57 They construct an argument about the relationship between
shame and aggression. Shame does not always lead to aggression. It does so when it
is treated stigmatically, that is, in such a way that cuts the humiliated off from
others, when it remains unacknowledged and when it is communicated disrespect-
fully. When shame is acknowledged rather than denied, it is of brief duration and
serves as a signal, allowing for the repair of damaged bonds. When shame is denied
it becomes recursive and self-perpetuating, building a wall between persons and
groups, and giving rise to a chain reaction, in which shame builds on shame.
Scheff and Rezinger argue that shame is one of the most disguised emotions and
one that may lie behind more overt expressions of anger or fear. Denial occurs when
one is ashamed of being ashamed.58 Thus it first and foremost relates to a dialogue
with the self, in which the emotion of shame is denied, and transformed into a
different negative emotion, such as anger. While shame focuses on the self, anger is
directed to the other. The emotion may be related to an act of humiliation (causing
shame in another). In this respect, expressions of anger may be part of a language
game. The self, unable to acknowledge painful emotions inside, articulates the
problem outward, as betrayal or humiliation by another. An Other may reinforce the
boundaries separating the isolated self through a further denial.
This raises questions about how a disguised emotion becomes bound up in a
social world and translated into something else. While all of the authors recognise a
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role for political leadership in mobilising these emotions, they fail to sufficiently
delineate the relationship between the two levels. The reason for an emotion is
different for the individual and the community, although not unrelated. Individuals
in a context of war experience loss of specific loved ones or the devastation of their
social world. This is unavoidably linked to the political world in so far as the larger
context of war is the source of the individual loss. Making sense of individual loss is
thus in part a function of the meaning of the political event. The loss of individual
value is cushioned by the attachment of positive value, just as it may be exacerbated
by the absence of clear meaning or negative value. Accusations that Tony Blair led
British soldiers into war on false grounds are serious precisely because the
willingness to risk one’s life or lose a child is tied to the positive value of protecting
the community.
If the loss of life is widespread, as in World Wars I or II, and the meaning is tied
to intentional acts of betrayal or humiliation by others, or an experience of defeat,
the individual loss is doubled. If emotion by definition has meaning in a community
and in relation to others, then the meaning given by a community to its common
experience of war, reverberates back on the individual. Even when no direct loss is
incurred, individual identity and emotion are bound up in the political unit. The
emotions may remain disguised in individuals, but, to be translated into political
agency and identity, they must be put into words by leaders, who give meaning to
the individual experience by situating it in a larger context of group identity. This
may involve an alienation of individual emotion to the state. The following example
illustrates how widespread loss, given meaning in negative emotion, was translated
into a political solipsism.
Hitler and the trauma of World War I
Post-World War I Germany may seem an unusual place to explore this dynamic,
given it has been blamed for the outbreak of war and became the perpetrator of an
unprecedented level of violence in World War II. Yet, several authors, and not least
Scheff and Rezinger, have pointed to Germany’s humiliation after World War I as
the crucial building block of its later aggression.59 The larger context provides an
interesting background for asking why the populations of Britain and France, no
less affected by the massive loss of life in World War I, would develop an antipathy
for war, while in Germany the experience gave rise to aggressive action. The differ-
ence cannot be said to be a function of widespread neurological trauma, resulting
from war neurosis or ‘shell-shock’ in the trenches. This condition was widespread
among soldiers in all three countries.
Omer Bartov argues that following World War I the interplay between various
actors, state policies and individual mourning served to create different attitudes
toward war in Germany and France.60 Paradoxically, a defeated Germany came to
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celebrate war as an occasion for individual and collective glory. The result was an
increased willingness to sacrifice for the state. By contrast, the victorious French
intensified the perception of war as a site of individual and national suffering.
Veterans insisted they had a right and duty to fight against war, ‘having seen its true
face and realized its inhumanity’.61 The aftermath of the war produced two kinds of
(imagined) communities, whose common experience was articulated very differently:
The French community of suffering was unified by common pain and sorrow, bound together
by horror, determined to prevent such wars from ever happening again. The German battle
community was united through sacrifice and devotion to a common cause, the comradeship of
warriors, and the quest to extend its newly found values to postwar civilian society. Both
creatures of war, the community of suffering envisions a future without international conflict,
whereas the battle community perceives the front as a model for posterity. For both the present
is a battleground between past trauma and future hopes, but they pull in opposite directions.
Imbued with a missionary zeal, the one fights for prevention, the other for reenactment.62
From Bartov’s perspective, both the French and the Germans were responding to
an experience of trauma. In this respect, both looked to an idealised vision of future
community, against the backdrop of widespread loss and fragmentation. Both were
motivated by an idealist mission, the one to prevent any further war and the other to
re-enact it, in order to do it differently this time. However, the French acknowledged
the ‘common pain and sorrow’. In the German case it was denied. Negative emotions
constructed walls between self and other in the posture of ongoing battle.
It was also the meaning of the war’s conclusion, and the relationship to a larger
world, that distinguished Germany from the others. The populations of Britain and
France, the victors, said ‘never again’, while in Germany the seeds of Nazi ideology
were planted in the widespread unwillingness to accept defeat. The defeat of 1918
was experienced as ‘utterly traumatic’.63 A myth developed after the war that
Germany hadn’t been defeated but ‘betrayed’, stabbed in the back by traitors,
pacificists, Jews, and, in particular, the politicians of the Weimar government. When
Germany went to the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, the Germans still didn’t
believe they had lost. The feelings of betrayal were further exacerbated by the
humiliating conditions imposed at Versailles. As Michael Burleigh states:
At Versailles in May 1919, the German delegation to the peace negotiations was shocked to
discover that President Wilson’s principles of self-determination excluded their country.
Under the first terms offered, which were bolstered with Allied ultimatum, Germany lost all
her overseas colonies and the territories claimed by her neighbors; union between Germany
and Austria was forbidden; limitations were imposed on the size and nature of her armed
forces, and officer cadet academies, the General Staff, tanks and the incipient air force were
abolished. There were to be reparations, as yet unspecified, by way of atonement for allegedly
causing the war, as reflected in Article 231 ascribing sole ‘war guilt’ to Germany. Military
manpower shrank from 800,000 in April 1919 to 100,000 in January 1921, while 30,000 of the
34,000 officer’s corps were discharged. If the military restrictions struck at a primary symbol
of national prowess, and at the caste personifying it, the ‘war guilt’ clause and demands that
Germany surrender her alleged war criminals seemed unjust and vindictive.64
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The shaming of Germany by the international community stigmatised Germany
rather than reintegrating it. As Braithwaite has argued in a study of crime, stigmatis-
ation, which is analogous to pathological shaming, leads to high crime rates.65
Stigmatisation damages the bond between the punisher and the punished, leading to
the formation of criminal subgroups. The contrast is interesting in light of the
alternative approach to shaming Germany after World War II, which, following a
war crimes trial of leaders, emphasised reintegrating Germany into a community of
states, in order to prevent a recurrence of the earlier pattern.
There were at least three constitutive elements of a politics of trauma in this
context. They together consolidated the political solipsism of Germany. The first
was the widespread physical and psychological trauma experienced by individual
soldiers, which was a consequence of trench warfare throughout Europe – and
therefore not specific to Germany – as well as the widespread experience of loss
among the population (the loss of valued others). The second, and more decisive for
this argument, was the experience of the defeat as a betrayal by the German
government, among others, of its people (denial of the shame of defeat). The third
was the humiliating terms imposed by the international community after the war,
including the isolation of Germany (denial of acknowledgement from the other).
The latter two were explicitly political in that the traumatised ‘body’ was defined at
the intersection between internal betrayal and external humiliation. The three
together were constitutive of a politics of trauma.
The interpretation of defeat as betrayal and humiliation preceded Hitler. The
Nazis were made possible by the trauma of World War I, but they were also quite
skillful in manipulating public emotions.66 Hitler gave voice to emotional states that
were unexpressed by the public. As Bromberg and Small state:
The abundant, almost unheard of expression of hate and rageful anger … fired [Hitler’s]
successful orations…[He spoke] the unspeakable for them. His practice of touching off
hostile emotions rather than conveying mere critical ideas was wildly successful.67
Rather than a community attuned to its suffering in war, the emotions were turned
inward to betrayal and outward to humiliation by others. In Mein Kampf, Hitler
refers to the Versailles treaty as ‘this instrument of boundless extortion and abject
humiliation’. He goes on to speak of the ‘common sense of shame and a common
hatred’ among sixty million people that would ‘become a single fiery sea of flame’.68
World War I was presented as a past trauma to be avenged. This message was
reinforced by Hitler’s visit to the former battlefields of World War I, after which he
was greeted by millions of adoring Germans as he returned to Berlin. In avenging
the past, and promising to do it differently, he provided an alternative picture of an
idealised future community. This message was captured in a literal picture of the
past. The Nazis made masterful use of a photograph taken in a German beer garden
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at the time World War I broke out. The photograph, already a symbol of August
1914, showed Germans joyful and celebrating. As it happens, Hitler was in the beer
garden and was among the people depicted in the photograph. His picture was
blown up and reproduced as part of an effort to make Hitler a symbol of the unified
and strong Germany of August 1914. This was accompanied by a message that he
was ready to revenge Germany’s humiliation and the loss of the fallen soldiers of
World War I.
The readiness of public opinion for further sacrifice in the German context was
the seedbed within which Hitler and the Nazis constructed a cohesive national
identity. The Nazis strategically manipulated existing sentiments to their own ends.
The two were mutually constituted. The context provided the material for weaving
together the meaning of Germany’s losses in negative emotions of betrayal and
humiliation, projected on to others, which constituted a rupture with them, and the
isolation of the German people. These were transformed by Hitler and the Nazis
into a solipsist Germany, ever vigilant in its relations to a dangerous external world
and equally dangerous internal enemies.
Hitler mobilised Germany in the aftermath of World War I on the basis of the
trauma of that war. In a context where Germany was isolated from the international
community, and bled dry financially by the terms of the Versailles Treaty, Hitler gave
meaning to German feelings of humiliation, thereby setting the stage for the
construction of the ‘Thousand Year Reich’, and a replay of war. A sergeant, in 1933,
set out the reasons for becoming a National Socialist in terms of the religion ‘born
out of the German national awakening of 1 August 1914 and our people’s great
struggle between 1914 and 1918’.69 The war was not over, but had to be replayed to
a different outcome. Germany, once humiliated and betrayed, became perpetrator.
Identity and agency
Grief is a measure of the significance of the lost person, and compassion a recogni-
tion of others as a part of the bystander’s goals and projects. It thus rests on a
positive relationship and evaluative judgement. Trauma relates to the obverse. The
shock of trauma resides not only in physical disaster, but in loss of control and
powerlessness vis-à-vis others. In a case of genocide, the loss is clearly related to the
intentional acts of an Other. The relationship is somewhat less straightforward in the
case of war. War is a practice of mutual injury.70 It is a contest over some good that
has value for both parties. While both sides experience massive loss of life, at least
historically, only one side, with defeat, experiences a further more immaterial loss of
control over self-definition and the future.71 This outcome may be more or less
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absolute, and may involve more or less negotiation of entitlements, but by definition
the outcome of war is that the victors gain in identity and agency while the defeated
lose in this area. The tendency for history to be written by the victors, and to
attribute blame for the conflict to the defeated, represents a further loss of agency by
the defeated.72 In this respect, Germany’s defeat in war rested on a triple loss of the
multiple connections that make an individual or a collective entity into a social
being. It involved the loss of persons (loss of valued others). It involved the loss of
trust due to a perception of betrayal and humiliation (the assumption of harmful
intent). It involved a loss of identity and agency (loss of self value, that is, shame,
and value in the eyes of others).
An experience of social trauma creates the conditions for leaders to mobilise the
solipsism of the group. This may involve a triple move. One move is the denial of
one’s own loss, for example, the denial of defeat. Another move is denial by the
other. When X acts toward Y as if they are of no value, that is, as if they are
disposable or non-entities, the identity and agency of X is taken away (for example,
the humiliating conditions of Versailles). In this respect, they cease to exist as
identities who have a place in a connected community with others. A third move
involves the reconstitution of identity and agency. Y may cease to exist as a distinct
identity, and become absorbed in the identity of X. Alternatively, in order to survive,
Y must reconstitute itself as a separate identity, unconnected to others. While
originating with an experience of being victim, and, subsequently, a loss of agency,
agency is reconstituted in the determination to reattribute value to the self in order
to restore dignity and identity. This requires replaying the past in order to do it
differently (for example, the determination to make Germany great again). It rests
on a vision of future self, since identity and dignity have yet to be established. As a
separate and isolated identity, Y must expand the boundaries of the self in order to
assure it will not occupy the position of victim in the future. Instead, Y steps into
the position of perpetrator.
In the case of post-World War I Germany, Hitler set out to re-enact World War I
in order to make Germany great again. In the process, one supposed source of
betrayal, the Jews, became the objects of genocide. Other peoples in Europe, and
particularly the Slavs, also became enemies to be eliminated. About 85,000 people of
all nationalities lost their lives at the most notorious concentration camp at
Jasenovac in the former Yugoslavia, primarily through beatings or starvation. The
Croat Ustasa brutally massacred entire Serb villages.
Hitler’s legacy is to have passed the trauma on to new victims. The genocide of
the Jews gave legitimacy to the Israeli state. The Holocaust and its potential recur-
rence has been a driving force behind Israeli aggression against the Palestinians.73 In
cases marked by humiliation and helplessness, a version of the trauma may remain
in the minds of the victims long after the overwhelming physical danger disappears.
For instance, testimonial work in Bosnia revealed that survivors were not merely
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preoccupied within their recent suffering in war, but had reservoirs of previously
unspoken trauma related to World War II.74 Reporters in the Balkan wars who
listened to stories of atrocity noted a frequent uncertainty about whether the stories
had occurred yesterday or in 1941, 1841 or 1441.75
In the former Yugoslavia, the trauma of the World War II remained buried
throughout Tito’s reign, but with his death and the end of the Cold War re-emerged.
Serb leaders, and not least Milosevic, gave voice to and mobilised fears that the past
would repeat itself, justifying the violence of Serbs toward others, and giving rise to
a new bloodbath. As Julie Mertus argues, the emotions preceded Milosevic, and
were forged out of a series of interactions over a longer period preceding his conver-
sion from communist to nationalist in the late 1980s.76 The Serbs, who had been
victims of the Croatian Ustasa and earlier, of the Ottomans, became perpetrators in
a new war. The suffering of World War II did not end with the war.77
Conclusion
In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein showed that we are bewitched in
thinking that the individual mind can be separated out from a larger social world.
Language, the shared property of the social world, its glue, is central, whether it
constitutes the self as embedded in community or divorced from it. Grief and
trauma represent different boundaries, customs and institutions. Trauma is an
expression of unresolved mourning, which may contribute to the constitution of the
solipsist self, whether individual or collective, who must replay the past in order to
do it differently, to reconstitute identity and agency or cease to exist.
The original distinction between ‘grief’ and ‘trauma’ is less one of the embedded
vs. the isolated individual than the constitution of positive emotion and porous
boundaries within a community, or a world – no less social – of solipsist selves,
governed by fear, betrayal and humiliation. Trauma, in this view, is not merely a
neurological phenomena experienced by individuals. It is an existential position
constituted in relation to others. Arguably, the existential experience precedes any
neurological change in individuals. The child who is abused by a parent is
traumatised first and foremost by the betrayal and loss of any safety in the home.
Fearfulness and hypervigilance come to occupy its place. A socially constructed view
of emotions places meaning at the core of experience, and language as the place
where boundaries are drawn, whether between individuals or between collective
entities, such as states.
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Winter and Kristeva make a distinction between meaningful symbols in the
traditional language of mourning and a ‘dislocation’ and loss of meaning, more
akin to trauma. This article has attempted to present a different contrast. While
traditional language and symbols were important for mediating grief, the state, in
the case of Nazi Germany, became the mediator of trauma, in a dialectic relation-
ship between inside betrayal and outside isolation and humiliation. A coherent
collective identity was constituted out of this tension, as individual isolation
and fear were given meaning in the transcendent state which would avenge past
humiliation. Out of the fragmentation, feelings of betrayal and humiliation were
‘deployed’ or ‘enveloped’ vis-à-vis the Jew, as the internal enemy, and a dangerous
world of ‘others’ outside. Any transcendent, eternal meaning for the massive loss
was displaced into the artificial construct of a state, embarked on a messianic
mission.
The concept of trauma may seem problematic in so far as it suggests that per-
petrators should be relieved of moral responsibility if they themselves have been
victims. While this complicated subject cannot be explored here, the concepts of
denial or acknowledgement open a space for greater reflexivity about past and
future action. Within this framework, Nazi Germany is no less morally responsible
for the Holocaust; what becomes clear is the moral responsibility of the inter-
national community for reinforcing the conditions in which Hitler rose to power.
Arguably the international community took this point on board in its handling of
Germany after World War II, although there was no attention to the emotional
dynamics. Rather than isolating and humiliating Germany, a deliberate effort was
made to integrate it into a community of states, in order to avoid a replay of the
past. This involved a form of reintegrative shaming, in the prosecution of
individual leaders during the Nuremberg trials, and the incorporation of Germany
into a larger European community. The Nuremberg trials represented a shift at
the international level away from collective responsibility to the individual
responsibility of leaders.
To speak of trauma, the most individual of experiences, is to bring it into a
political world. Speaking of pain or asking for acknowledgement are part of a
language game, which is expressed in a relationship (who harmed who) and a moral
order (an acknowledgement or denial of blame, innocence or complicity). The
question is one of how this politics is expressed and the consequences. Acknowledge-
ment of suffering reconstitutes a social bond. This bond involves a reconnection to
the self. In speaking directly of, and no longer denying the experience, the victim re-
enters a dialogue with the self, as well as a dialogue with others. In the act of denial,
the self is cut off from the self and others. Emotions may then be alienated to
another level of experience, that is, the political, where they become part of the
mobilisation of group solipsism.
At the international level, the choice can be situated in Nussbaum’s framework of
evaluative judgement. If EJ (1), that is, that which we consider to increase our
flourishing, is seen to extend to and overlap with EJ (2), a compassion toward the
other, we will seek action that does not separate out our own interests from those of
an other who suffers. By contrast, in a traditional realist formula, EJ (1), our
flourishing, is decisive and cancels out EJ (2), compassion towards the other. If EJ
(1) cancels out EJ (2), there is an increased probability that loss and grief will be
transformed into trauma, given the conditions for successful mourning are absent.
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For example, since 11 September 2001 the voices of Palestinians have been silenced,
the rudimentary state structures they had created have been all but destroyed, and
they have been further isolated within the international community. The outcome of
prioritising EJ (1) over EJ (2) is, over the long-term, that the silenced or unresolved
grief potentially contributes to the reproduction of trauma in some future case.
When placed in this framework, the costs and benefits of the realist formula, based
on a conflict between EJ (1) and EJ (2), change. One’s own EJ (1), that is, what we
now understand to contribute to our own flourishing, is broadened if we must now
incorporate the increased probability that a failure of compassion, that is, the failure
to recognise the suffering of others as a part of our own goals and projects, will
increase the probability of future suffering, which may reverberate back on the self.78
The failure of compassion today may contribute to the reproduction of violence in
the future. Given this future is unknown, we do not know who the future victim may
be. Thus there is a possibility that some loved one or value may become a victim.79
The events of September 11 can be placed in this framework. If the pilots who
crashed into the World Trade Center and Pentagon were inspired by the lack of US
compassion to the plight of Palestinian or Iraqi children, the trauma of the latter
has been constitutive of the trauma experienced by Americans on September 11.
Thus, the increased repression of Palestinians will only increase the likelihood of
further acts that will reproduce the trauma experienced by Americans and Israelis.
Against the background of globalisation, the spiral of trauma threatens to circle
back on the very people the state claims to protect.
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78 This logic was evident in British opposition to the invasion of Iraq. There were fears that an attack
would increase rather than decrease the threat of terrorism.
79 This line of reasoning is compatible with the idea of the veil of ignorance in John Rawls, Theory of
Justice.
